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 Plato as Teacher of Socrates? 
Rafael Ferber 
Universität Luzern / Universität Zürich 
That the historical Socrates did exist is a fact beyond reasonable doubt.1 It is also a fact 
that Plato made him the protagonist of his early and middle dialogues, including the Sympo-
sium. Although Socrates as protagonist has been replaced in the later dialogues by the Eleatic 
Stranger, Timaeus and the Athenian, even the latter two remain Socratics in at least one im-
portant point. Both defend again the paradox that nobody does wrong willingly (cf. Tim. 
86d7-e3; Leg. V 731c3-5, IX 860d1-2). If we assume that Plato expresses with the voices of 
Timaeus and the Athenian some of his own views, we may also assume that Plato, too, re-
mains a Socratic (at least in this sense) throughout his life. In the following, I concentrate on 
the Platonic Socrates without discussing the philosophy of the historical Socrates – with the 
exception of a guess at the end.  
I therefore do not enter into the question of what distinguishes the historical Socrates 
from the Platonic one, but what distinguishes the Socrates of the early from the Socrates of 
the middle dialogues. According to a well-known opinion, the “dividing line” lies in the dif-
ference between the Socratic and the Platonic theory of action. Whereas for the Platonic Soc-
rates of the early dialogues all desires are good-dependent, for the Platonic Socrates of the 
middle dialogues there are good-independent desires. I argue first (I) that this “dividing line” 
is blurred in the Symposium, and second (II) that we have in the Symposium a more distinc-
tive dividing line, namely the introduction of the separate existence of the idea of beauty. 
I. 
Socrates – [...] – is fundamentally at odds with Plato on the implications of only one question: 
a question about psychology of action. This is the question whether it is possible for any ac-
tions in that standard group of actions which Aristotle would later call ‘voluntary actions’ to 
be the direct result merely of irrational desires taken together with certain beliefs.2  
Under irrational desires, the authors of this statement – T. Penner and Ch. Rowe – seem 
to understand blind desires based on “physiological needs”.3 Terminologically we may call 
these irrational – or subrational – desires “sensations” in distinction from “emotions”. 
Whereas sensations are not directed at intentional objects and are not dependent on some 
cognition of the good, emotions are directed at and depend on some cognition of the good. 
Sensations such as hunger or thirst, as simple raw experiences, have not yet fastened on any 
“objects” in the world. But they also include a degree of conscious experience and qualitative 
but not yet representational content. In distinction, emotions – such as anger (thymos), pleas-
ure (hedone), grief (lype), love (eros) and fear (phobos) (cf. Prot. 352b7-8) – include repre-
-------------------------------------------- 
1 Cf. Kleve (1987). 
2 Penner & Rowe (2005), 295. 
3 Rowe (2005), 216. 
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sentational and cognitive content. In fact, the Socrates of the Apology makes it sound as if 
fear is just a cognitive condition: “To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself 
wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know” (Apol. 29a5-b1, transl. 
Grube). To use stoic terminology, sensations are pre-emotions or propatheiai, whereas emo-
tions are pathe based on judgments.4 
So formulated, the thesis would be that Plato introduced with the epithymetikon of his 
tripartite model of the soul sensations or propatheiai. The epithymetikon would then be a pre-
emotion or propatheia. Although the doctrine of the tripartite soul may be traced back to the 
Apology (29d8) and the Gorgias (493a3-4),5 we find the explicit argument for it only in the 
Republic (cf. 435e-442a).6 Nevertheless, the tripartite soul may also be implied in the Sympo-
sium when Diotima distinguishes between love for money-making (chrematismon), love for 
sport (philogymnastia) and love for wisdom (philosophia) (Symp. 205d4-5)7 and between dif-
ferent kinds of immortality: biological, which corresponds to the epithymetikon, and merito-
rious (Symp. 208d-210a), which corresponds to the thymoeides.8 Eros is a kind of epithymia 
(cf. Symp. 200a2-3)9 and seems to be itself tripartite, so that each part of the tripartite soul has 
its own eros, the epithymetikon, e.g. for money, the thymoeides for social recognition and the 
logistikon for wisdom. 
This tripartite model of the soul has been treated in Plato scholarship separately from 
other models of the soul. But we gain additional intelligibility of this model if we supplement 
it with the tripartite model introduced by Descartes and repeated by F. Brentano. Descartes 
distinguishes (a) ideas (in his sense),10 (b) judgments and (c) acts of will,11 and Brentano dis-
tinguishes (a) representations, (b) judgments and (c) acts of will, which he also calls motions 
of the soul, interests, or acts of love and hate.12 This model may go back to Aristotle, insofar 
as right desire (orexis orthe) presupposes true thinking or judgment (logos alethes) (cf. EN VI 
2, 1139a21-26) and thinking images (phantasmata) (cf. An. III 7, 431a14-16). Because “acts 
of will” in the broad sense of desires (epithymiai) are based on a belief, it partially even goes 
back to the early dialogues of Plato (cf. Prot. 358c6-d2, Gorg. 468b1-2). According to this 
model, consciousness has different levels. The lowest is that of (a) ideas or representations, 
the second of (b) judgments and the third of (c) acts of will. Judgments require ideas or repre-
sentations; acts of will require both judgments and representations. Without representations, I 
cannot regard anything as either true or false, or desire anything as good or bad. Like-
wise, without judgment, that is, without evaluating something as good or bad, I cannot desire 
-------------------------------------------- 
4 Cf. for this distinction, e.g., Seneca, De ira II 2: [...] Omnes enim motus qui non uoluntate nostra fiunt 
inuicti et ineuitabiles sunt, ut horror frigida adspersis, ad quosdam tactus aspernatio; ad peiores nunti-
os surriguntur pili et rubor ad inproba uerba suffunditur sequiturque uertigo praerupta cernentis: quo-
rum quia nihil in nostra potestate est, nulla quominus fiant ratio persuadet. Ira praeceptis fugatur; est 
enim uoluntarium animi uitium, non ex his quae condicione quadam humanae sortis eueniunt ideoque 
etiam sapientissimis accidunt, inter quae et primus ille ictus animi ponendus est qui nos post opinionem 
iniuriae mouet. I owe the reference to stoic terminology to Anthony Price.  
5 Cf. Burnet (1924), ad 29d8: “This enumeration [sophia, ischys, chremata] implies the doctrine of the 
‘tripartite soul’; for it gives the objects of to epithymetikon, to thymoeides, and to logistikon”. Slings 
(1994), 137 n. 33: “tês [...] psychês touto en hôi epithumiai eisi. This implies the existence of to epi-
thymetikon; it certainly is much more definitive than the popular distinction between ‘reason and im-
pulse’ [Dodds ad loc.]”. 
6 Cf. Ferber (2013), 233-236, with further literature. 
7 So Vallejo-Campos (2013), 196. 
8 Cf. Hobbs (2000), 251, and Nehamas (2004), both quoted in Sheffield (2006), 228. 
9 This has been brought out by Sheffield (2012), 213-215. 
10 Descartes (1641), 160.  
11 Descartes (1996), Meditation 3, Section 5. 
12 Psychology II (1973), ch. 6, § 3. 
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it as good or reject it as bad. As a rule, we do not desire or avoid “blindly” but “see” because 
our response is based on judgment. But this judgment need not always be explicit or pro-
nounced. We sometimes find certain people appealing or unappealing, pleasant or unpleasant 
“at first sight”. As Shakespeare put it: “Who ever lov’d, that lov’d not at first sight?” (As You 
like It, Act III, Scene 5). The point is that desires are based on a certain belief.  
If we put these two tripartite models of the soul together, they do not contradict each oth-
er. On the contrary, the Cartesian/Brentanonian model functions well as the foundation of the 
tripartite Platonic one. So we have the following “quinquepartite” model:  
a) ideas, representations (phantasmata) 
b) judgments 
c) acts of will in the broad sense, or first-order desires corresponding to the desires of the epi-
thymetikon 
d) acts of will in a more narrow sense, or second-order desires corresponding to the desires of 
the thymoeides 
e) acts of reason corresponding to the logistikon. 
Where is eros in the Symposium located in this scheme? Surely eros is not merely some-
thing like a sexual itch, a sensation or propatheia. Eros is cognitively more advanced, an 
emotion or a desire (epithymia): “The main point is this: every desire (epithymia) for good 
things or for happiness is the ‘supreme and treacherous love (doleros eros) in everyone’” 
(Symp. 205d1-3, transl. Nehamas & Woodruff). “Treacherous love” surely involves a cogni-
tive component, a (perhaps erroneous) judgment on what is good (cf. Symp. 206a1, 206a11-
12).13 Eros in the Symposium is dependent on some cognition of the good or good-dependent. 
The psychology of eros in the Symposium is in this respect not different from emotions like 
eros in the Protagoras (cf. Prot. 352b7-8), which are not blind, but involve a cognitive com-
ponent.14 Concerning the Symposium, we may say: instead of a sharp difference between the 
Socrates of the early dialogues and of the Symposium, we have continuity concerning the 
treatment of emotions like eros, since eros as a form of epithymia involves a cognitive com-
ponent. The theory of Eros is not a “dividing line” between the Socrates of the early dia-
logues and of the Symposium.15 
II. 
Nevertheless Plato, the author of the Symposium, must have been aware of deviating 
from the Socrates of his early dialogues when he lets him report the teaching of Diotima. As 
the author of the Apology, Plato refers to the Pythia to give Socrates’ mission divine authority 
(Apol. 21a6); thus, as the author of the Symposium, Plato lets Socrates refer to “a woman of 
Mantinea, Diotima, who was wise both in these things and in much else” (Symp. 201d2-3) to 
give Socrates’ theory of Love the authority of a “seer”. Later Diotima is called “wisest” 
(Symp. 208b8) and even the “most perfect sophist” (Symp. 208c1-2). She seems to have al-
ready reached the level of the philosopher-kings and queens in the Republic and may even be 
superior to them who are wise (cf. Resp. 546a8) by having supernatural powers (cf. Symp. 
201d3-5). Although love is the only thing Socrates confesses to know (Symp. 177d7-8; cf. 
Theag. 128b2-4, Lysis 204c1-2), Diotima seems to realize that Socrates has not yet reached 
-------------------------------------------- 
13 These three passages have been treated in Sheffield (2006), 229-230. 
14 Cf. Ferber (1991), esp. 54-55, and Rowe (2006). 
15 Cf. for the Symposium as a Socratic dialogue Rowe (2006). Pace Rowe the psychology of action is in 
my opinion also not the “dividing” line between the Socrates of the early dialogues and of the Republic, 
cf. Ferber (2013), esp. 233-236. 
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the ultimate knowledge of the object of love (Symp. 209e5-210a3, transl. Rowe, small modi-
fications by Rafael Ferber):  
[S1] Into these aspects of love, probably, Socrates, you too could be initiated (myetheies);  
[S2] but as for those aspects relating to the final revelation (ta de teleia kai epoptika), the ones 
for the sake of which I have taught you the rest, if one approaches these correctly – I don’t 
know whether you would be capable of being initiated into them.  
[S3] Well, she said, I’ll tell you this next part, and spare no effort in doing so;  
[S4] and you must try to follow, if you can.  
The first sentence [S1] says that Socrates could be initiated into these “aspects of love”, 
that is, the elenctic instruction in the passage 201d1-209e3. Although Diotima here is already 
using the expression myeo, which means “initiate into the mysteries”, she refers to the in-
struction she gave to Socrates by applying the Socratic method of elenchos to Socrates him-
self. These are the “lower” mysteries. 
The second sentence [S2] mentions ta de teleia kai epoptika, that is, the final things to be 
seen – terminology which remembers again that of the mysteries.16 Since with ta de teleia kai 
epoptika, the idea of beauty is meant, the introduction into this idea is something analogous 
to an introduction into the “higher” mysteries. But Diotima expresses doubt that Socrates is 
able to follow her. Socrates is in a similar position to Diotima as Glaukon is to Socrates in the 
Republic (cf. Resp. 533a1-5). As Socrates in the Republic indicates the intellectual limits of 
Glaucon, so Diotima mentions the limits of Socrates. Since Diotima’s speech is an invention 
of Plato, the author of the Symposium, Plato, is indicating the intellectual limits of Socrates. 
The passage has been interpreted in this way by most interpreters.17  
In the third sentence [S3], Diotima behaves again toward Socrates as Socrates does to-
ward Glaucon (Resp. 533a2), since neither spares any willingness (prothymia) to share their 
knowledge. So the fault is not Diotima’s if Socrates cannot follow, just as it is not Socrates’ 
fault that Glaucon cannot follow. 
In the fourth sentence [S4], Diotima commands Socrates to follow if he can follow, and 
so Diotima is reinforcing her doubt concerning the intellectual limit of her pupil. Socrates’ 
limit is exactly indicated: the limit to pass from the agreement or the homologia he has 
reached with Diotima on the topic of eros to see the reality of the object of love, the idea of 
beauty.  
Nevertheless, a minority of scholars think otherwise. I mention Alfred Edward Taylor:  
It has even been seriously argued that Plato is here guilty of the arrogance of professing that 
he has reached philosophical heights to which the “historical” Socrates could not ascend. Eve-
rything becomes simple if we remember that the actual person speaking is Socrates, reporting 
the words of Diotima. Socrates […] as a modest man, cannot say anything that would imply 
that he has already “attained perfection” or is assured of “final perseverance”.18 
It is right that Socrates is reporting Diotima. But since Plato invented this report and put 
it into the mouth of Socrates, the image of Socrates in the Symposium would be very different 
from that in the Republic. Then Socrates would have really seen, that is, understood, the idea 
of beauty, something he denies explicitly concerning the idea of the Good in the Republic. He 
says only that he would insist that “something like” (toiouton ti) “the truth itself” (auto to 
-------------------------------------------- 
16 Cf. Riedweg (1987), 20-29. 
17 Cf. the authors mentioned in Bury (1932), 123; Sier (1997), 273 n. 225. 
18 Taylor (1936), 229 n. 1. 
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alethes) is finally to be seen (idein) (Resp. 533a3-5). He never says that he has seen the “truth 
itself”. Socrates would then himself be on the level of the imagined philosopher-kings.  
Of course, we find the theory of ideas already in the Euthyphron 6d-e. But what we do 
not find is the characterization of the ideas in the Parmenidean predicates of the Symposium: 
the idea of beauty (a) is always and neither comes into being nor perishes, neither increases 
nor decreases (210e6-211a2); (b) is absolutely beautiful (211a2-5); (c) is incorporeal (211a5-
7); (d) is placeless (211a6b1); (e) is identical with itself and one (211b1); and (f) is not af-
fected by the changing things (211b3-5).19  
That in the introduction of separate ideas lies the “dividing line” between Socrates and 
Plato is confirmed by Plato’s first interpreter, Aristotle: “But Socrates did not make the uni-
versals or the definitions exist apart; his successors, however, gave them separate existence, 
and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas” (Metaph. Μ 4 1078a29-32). Aristotle is 
speaking of the historical Socrates. Since all other primary sources of the historical Socrates – 
Aristophanes (Nub. 740 ff.) and Xenophon (Mem. IV 5, 11)20 – attest, like Plato in the early 
dialogues, that Socrates has dialectic power, we may guess that the introduction of the sepa-
rate or quasi-parmenidean existence of ideas is the “dividing line” between the Socrates of 
the early and the middle dialogues.  
In the terminology of the divided line in the Republic, we may formulate the epistemo-
logical counterpart to the introduction of separate ideas in the following way: just as the ge-
ometrical propositions express a dianoetic, but not yet a noetic knowledge (cf. Resp. 533d5), 
in the same vein the knowledge of Socrates is “dianoetic” knowledge of love since he gets 
homologoumena with Diotima, but does not have “noetic” understanding of the final object 
of love, namely beauty.21 This also makes sense of the following statement: “My [wisdom], I 
guess, will be an inferior sort of wisdom, or even a debatable one, existing as if in a dream” 
(Symp. 175e2-3). Socrates’ wisdom is an inferior one existing like that of the mathematicians 
as if in a dream (Resp. 533b6-c3) because homologoumena may correspond with reality or 
not, as a dream may correspond with reality or not. Only “noetic” understanding of the object 
of love, in Diotima’s or Plato’s view the vision of the idea of beauty, gives correspondence. 
I conclude with a guess on the philosophy of the historical Socrates: the separation of 
ideas and lack of (noetic) understanding of these ideas may have been the limit of the philos-
ophy of the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues and the historical Socrates. But since it 
would have been immodest if Plato, the pupil of Socrates, had overtly played the teacher of 
Socrates, he put his teaching into the mouth of Diotima.  
Nevertheless, also this guess, based on the homologia between Aristophanes, Plato, Xen-
ophon and Aristotle, is still “an inferior sort of wisdom, or even a debatable one, existing as 
in a dream” since none of us has immediate knowledge of the philosophy of the historical 
Socrates.22 
* 
Brentano, F., Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London 1973 (Transl. A. C. Rancurello, 
D.B. Terrelland, L. L. McAlister) = Brentano (1973). 
-------------------------------------------- 
19 This has been fully developed in the contribution of Kraus. Cf. also Ferber (19892), 38-48; Sier 
(1997), 11, 284. 
20 Cf. Philippson (1932). 
21 Cf. Ferber (2007). 
22 My thanks go to Lesley Brown, Francisco Gonzalez, Anthony Price and Nicholas Smith for some 
helpful remarks. 
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